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Abstract
This article builds on my earlierscholarshipon Afrcan approachesto internationallaw through examining the
evolution of the right to development. Previously, I identifiedtwo approachesto internationallaw in Africa - a
contibutionist (or weak) approach and a critical (or strong) approach. Through analysis of the tight to

development in the work of two eminent Senegalistjudsts, Doudou Thiam andKeba Mbaye, I show that while
Thiam adopts a radicalstance thatfalls within the realm of critical approaches, Mbaye charts a third way:
One that shares aspects of both approaches but has distinct characteristicsof its own. These distinct elements
show diverse and nuancedAficanperspectives, many ofwhich are neithernarrowly universalistin a Eurocentdc
sense norparochiallyethnocentric because they take too seriouslyAfricaniy. Acknowledging disparateandoften
competing strandsof Third Worldism is importantin a moment of declining United States umpolariy. This
decline opens an entypointforassessing thirdworld visions of regionalandglobalorderfrom the past and their

continued vitaliy and relevance today.
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1

Introduction

In my prior work, I have argued that there are two major approaches to international
law in Africa: a contributionist (or weak) approach, and a critical (or strong) approach.!
Below, I explain what I mean by these two terms, contributionist and critical. This
article updates that earlier work through examining the origins of the right to
development. In so doing, it identifies two approaches to thinking about the right to
development: A radical tradition represented in the scholarship of Doudou Thiam,

* Wing-Tat Lee Chair of International Law, Loyola University Chicago School of Law. An earlier draft was

presented at the Keba Mbaye Conference on African Approaches to InternationalLaw with a Focus on InternationalHuman
Rights Law, Center for Human Rights, University of Pretoria, 5-6 December 2018.

1James Gathu, 'International Law and Eurocentricity' (1998) 9 EuropeanJournal of InternationalLaw 184; James
Gathii, 'Reviews: Mapping New Boundaries in African International Law' (2011) 2:3 TransnationalLegalTheory 429;
James Gathii, Obiora Okafor & Antony Anghie, 'Africa and TWAIL' (2010) 18:1 African Yearbook of International
Law 9; James Gathii, 'Africa' in Bardo Fassbender et al (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Histoy of InternationalLaw
(OUP, 2012).
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which aligns well with the critical tradition of African international legal scholarship;
and another one that complicates these two approaches to African international legal
scholarship. Keba Mbaye represents this third approach to international law in Africa.
With the onset of a Draft Convention on the Right to Development, it is particularly useful
to revisit the insights of two eminent Senegalese scholars influential in the right's
formation and early evolution.
Under the radical vision, the right to development was conceptualized as a
right of formerly colonial countries to recover the losses suffered from the
depredations of colonial conquest and plunder. This radical vision of the right to
development has since been submerged in the mainstream retelling of the origins and
history of the right to development. This article identifies a different approach in the
work of Keba Mbaye on the right to development. Like the radical approach, Mbaye
links the underpinnings of Africa's underdevelopment to the history of colonial rule.
However, unlike the critical traditions that the radical vision of the right to
development is associated with, Mbaye embraces the universality of international law
- although he does so in away that recognizes the particular agency of African peoples.
Contributionism is strongly allied to a belief that international law is the
product of many civilizational contributions. Similarly, Mbaye invoked a broad range
of inspirations, including African and European sources, to justify the recognition of
development as a right. In his 1972 lecture at the International Institute of Human
Rights in France, he argued that every 'man has a right to live and right to live better'.'
For him, it was not necessary to establish whether the right is solely an individual or
collective right.5 Unlike the critical tradition where the right to development is claimed
by formerly colonized states, in Mbaye's view the right was claimable by individuals.
However, the state plays the role of legal trustee and can also claim the right to
development on behalf of its people.6 Mbaye's approach is distinguishable from
Doudou Thiam, a Senegalese international lawyer who I introduce more fully below,
in the very different ways they invoked and used the right to development. Unlike
Mbaye, Thiam's was a more radical approach, consistent with the critical tradition of
African international law scholarship. In the critical tradition, the marginalization of
third world states and peoples cannot be fully understood apart from the global

2 UN Doc. A/HRC/WG.2/21/2/Add.1, 20 January 2020.

3 Surya Prakash Sinha, Legal Pojycentridfy and InternatonalLaw (Carolina, 1996); Yasuaki Onuma, A Transcivi/izatonal
Perspective on InternatonalLaw (Brill, 2010).
4 Keba Mbaye, 'Le droit du developpement comme un droit de l'homme' (1972) 5 Revue des droits de l'homme 503.
s Ibid, 508.
6

Keba Mbaye, 'Introduction: Human Rights and the Rights of Peoples' in Mohammed Bedjaoui (ed.), International

Law: Achievements and Prospects(Martinus Nijhoff, 1991).
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structures that condition national dynamics. 7 Further, global systems including those
of international human rights cannot fully be understood outside of the national
contexts that shape their content.
This article traces these two traditions on the right to development through
the thinking of two leading Senegalese international jurists - Keba Mbaye and Doudou
Thiam. Keba Mbaye lived from 1924 to 1997 and Doudou Thiam from 1926 to 1999.
They began their studies in Senegal and pursued further education in France, both
becoming international lawyers with global repute. Thiam studied in Senegal before
obtaining a political science and law degree at the University of Poitiers in France.
From 1959 to 1960, he served as Minister of Finance, Economic Affairs and Planning
in Mali. After that, from 1960 to 1968 he served as the first Foreign Minister of
independent Senegal under the presidency of Leopold Sedar Senghor. Later, he
became a member of the International Law Commission (ILC) between 1970 and
1999. He served as Special Rapporteur on the Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and
Security of Mankind from 1982 to 1995.8 This Draft Code is regarded as a forerunner to
the establishment of the International Criminal Court.9 He held several ILC offices
including Chairman in 1981.
Keba Mbaye for his part had a distinguished career as a judge and scholar. 0
He served as Vice-President of the International Court of Justice from 1983 to 1991
and, before that, as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Senegal as well as President
of the International Commission of Jurists from 1977 to 1985. He also served as
President of the Court of Arbitration for Sport, the highest Olympic tribunal whose
founding statutes he drafted." Mbaye was a member of the International Olympic
Committee and was in charge of the Committee that ended the Olympic boycott of
South Africa after the end of apartheid. 2 He also helped establish the Organization
for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa (OHADA), whose primary goals are

7James Gathii, 'The Agenda of Third World Approaches to International Law' in Jeffrey Dunoff & Mark Pollack

(eds.), InternationalLegal Theoy: Foundationsand Frontiers(CUP, forthcoming 2020).
8 Tribute to the memory of Doudou Thiam in the Yearbook of the InternationalLaw Commission Volume 1, Summay of
Records of the Meetings of the Fifty-First Session 3 May to 23 Juy 1999, 224-225 https://legal.un.org/ilc/publicatons/
yearbooks/english/ilc_1999_vl.pdf (accessed 13 August 2020).
9 Ibid, 224 para 7. Mr. Lukashuk notes that 'Doudou Thiam left behind many models; the history books would not

fail to record that it was he who prepared the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.' For his work and

influence on the definition of genocide, see William A. Schabas, Genocide in InternationalLaw: The Crime of Crimes
(CUP, 2009) 94, 95, 97, 102, 137, 146.
10

French Society for International Law, Keba Mbaye: 1924-2007 http://www.sfdi.org/intemationabstes/mbaye-

keba/ (accessed 13 August 2020).
" Court of Arbitration for Sport, Histoy of the CAS https://www.tas-cas.org/en/general-information/history-ofthe-cas.html (accessed 13 August 2020).

'Keba Mbaye, 82, Olympics Official, Is Dead', New York Times (January 2007) https://www.nytimes.com/
2007/01/13/sports/othersports/13mbaye.html (accessed 13 August 2020).
12
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to promote economic integration in French-speaking African states and to attract
foreign investment. 3 As Chair of the United Nations Human Rights Commission at
the same time that he was President of the International Commission of Jurists, in
1977 Mbaye oversaw the passage of Resolution 4 (XXXIII) on the Right to Development
and called upon the Secretary General of the United Nations to issue a report about
it." The United Nations eventually passed a resolution recognizing the right to
development in 1987.15 Mbaye also called upon and persuaded African governments
to craft an African Charteron Human and Peoples' Rights,'6 chairing the group of experts
that drafted it. In 1993, he urged politicians to respect elections results and resigned as
the President of the Senegalese Constitutional Court after he came under pressure to
certify Presidential election results.17
Since both Mbaye and Thiam wrote about international law and practiced it in
the post-independence moment, they are an apt pair to compare. Both believed in the
ability of international law to change the circumstances of those they cared about.
Mbaye certainly did with his commitment to the right to development. Although
Thiam believed in the right to development as well, for him it was a right that belonged
to formerly colonized countries to correct the inequities wrought by colonialism. In
revisiting this debate, it becomes possible to see which of these competing visions of
the right to development has prevailed and why. In so doing, this article reexamines
and chronicles a part of the rich legacy of ideas on the right to development that were
advanced by postcolonial leaders after decolonization and how they shaped the way
we understand international law today. It adds to small but growing literature that
focuses on the role of intellectuals from the global south often invisible in mainstream
international law scholarship.18

13 Keba Mbaye, 'La contribution de l'OHADA

i l'arbitrage

commercial international' in Briner L. Robert, Fortier

Yves, Berger Klaus Peter, and Bredow Jens (eds.), Law of InternationalBusiness and Dispute Settlement in the 2 1st Centuy:
LiberAmicorum Kar'-HeingBdckstiege/ (Carl Heymanns, 2001); Keba Mbaye, 'L'histoire et les objectifs de l'OHADA'
(2004) 205 Lespetites affiches 4, at 5; Martin Kirsch, 'Historique de l'OHADA' (1998) 827 Revuepenant 129, at 129;
Barry Walsh, In Search of Success: Case Studies in JusticeSector Development in Sub-SaharanAfrica (World Bank, 2010) 44.
Claude E. Welch Jr., ProtectingHuman Rights in Africa: Roles and Strategies of Non-Governmental Organisations(Penn
Press, 1995) 68.
'4

15 The United Nations General Assembly recognized the right to development in UNGA Res. 41/128, 4 December

1986. On 20 January 2002, the UN Working Group on the Right to Development released a Draft Convention on the
RPght to Development. It relies heavily on the 1986 Declaration and the nine core human rights treaties. It is not clear
whether this Draft Convention will help alleviate the differences that exist between the global south and north on the
right to development. See Nico Schrijver, 'A New Convention on the Human Right to Development: Putting the

Cart before the Horse?' (2020) 38:2 NetherlandsQuarteryof Human Rights 84.
Howard B. Tolley Jr., The InternationalCommission ofJurists: GlobalAdvocates for Human Rights (Penn Press, 1994)
145-148, 178-183.

16

17 Welch (1995) 31.
18 Cynthia Farid, 'Legal Scholactivists in the Third World: Between Ambition, Altruism and Access' (2016) 33

Windsor Yearbook ofAccess Justice 57 (examining the work of Kamal Hossain); Usha Natarajan, 'A TWAIL Reading
of the Arab Spring: Reflections on Sovereignty over Natural Resources', InauguralRP Anand InternationalLaw Essay
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In the first section, I revisit and update my prior contention that there are two
approaches to international law in Africa, describing the contributionist and critical
traditions. In the second section, I uncover the radical origins of the right to
development through the work of Thiam, which lies within the critical tradition. 9 This
is followed by an examination of Mbaye's approach to the right to development, which
both converges and diverges from contributionist and critical traditions in significant
ways and constitutes a distinct approach in itself. Overall, this essay elucidates the
varied, complex and contesting African contributions

to and aspirations

for

international law.
2

Approaches to International Law in Africa

Writing in 1963, Hans W. Baade concluded that there is 'at the present no typically
African school of thought in public international law, as contrasted with, say, Latin
American doctrine'.20 He further astoundingly concluded that there was little danger
to traditional western values lurking in a 'specific "African" conception of law, national
or international'. 2' According to this condescending and Eurocentric view, Africa had
yet to develop its own concept of international law. The assumption made was that
unless Africa had laws resembling those created in Europe and North America, it still
lived in the dark ages. Konrad Ginther long warned about this 'European ghetto' of
international law that he argued had to be lifted to enable multicultural learning and,
more crucially for purposes of this article, to redefine the foundations of international
law to be suitable for decolonization and development.
As alluded to above, in my prior work I argued that there are two major
approaches to international law in Africa: a contributionist (or weak) approach and a
critical (or strong) approach.23 Thus, unlike Baade and like Ginther, I have no doubt
(2011) http://www.publicinternationallaw.in/node/116 (reflecting on the scholarship of R.P. Anand); Adil Hasan
Khan, 'International Lawyers in the Aftermath of Disasters: Inheriting from Radhabinod Pal and Upendra Baxi'

(2016) 37:11 Third WorldQuartery 2061; James Gathii, 'A Critical Appraisal of the International Legal Tradition of
Taslim Olawale Elias' (2008) 21 Leiden JournalofInternationalLaw317.
This essay does not focus on the positivism and formalism that have characterized debates about the status,
content and legal nature of the right to development. Instead, it follows in the tradition of Mohammed Bedjaoui's
19

Towards a New InterationalEconomic Order (Holmes & Meier, 1979), which is a powerful critique of formalism in
international law and a commitment to more a fair and just international economic order. See also Margot E.

Salomon, 'From NIEO to Now and the Unfinishable Story of Economic Justice' (2013) 62:1 Internationaland
Comparative Law Quarterly 31, at 46-47; Margot E. Salomon, 'Winners and Others: Accounting for International
Law's Favourites' in Conor Gearty and Costas Douzinas (eds.) The Cambridge Companion to Human Rights Law (CUP,
2012) 271, at 284-285.
20

Hans Baade, 'Foreword' in Hans Baade (ed.), African Law: New Lawfor New Nations (Oceana, 1963).

21

Ibid, 8.

22 Konrad Ginther, 'Re-Defining International Law from the Point of View of Decolonisation and Development

and African Regionalism' (1982) 26:1 Journalof African Law 49, at 66.
23 Gathii (1998); Gathii (2011); Gathii, Okafor & Anghie (2010); Gathii (2012).
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that there are indeed African approaches to international law. For the purposes of this
paper, I outline two of these approaches. I fully acknowledge these two approaches
are ideal types, and in some of my later work I accept the limits of periodization
inherent in such an endeavor.24 Further, as Christopher Gevers argues, there is need
for a more granular and contextual approach to thinking about the apparent
divergences between these two approaches. 25 While Gevers' approach reads African
international legal scholarship through the lens of African literature and its own
engagement with decolonization, my approach compares engagement of African
international legal scholarship with colonialism and anticolonialism on the one hand,
and its engagement with 'western' views on decolonization on the other. Without
going into too much detail, this part of the paper outlines contributionist and critical
approaches as a backdrop to the subsequent discussion on radical visions of the right
to development.

The ContributionistApproach
Contributionism is the most longstanding and enduring tradition of African
international law. Contributionists argue that international legal history should be
corrected to reflect that Africa was, and continues to be, a central player in the making
of international law. For contributionists, international law is the product of numerous
civilizations rather than the sole product of Europe. From this perspective, Africa is
'an innovator and generator' of norms of international law. For example, Taslim
Olawale Elias's 1972 monograph, Africa and the Development of InternationalLaw, looked
to the distant past; and Mapping New Boundaries in African InternationalLawin 2008 edited
by Jeremy Levitt examines Africa's international law contributions in the postindependence era.
Contributionists emphasize the role of Africa in creating new norms of
international law, a possibility facilitated by decolonization. Decolonization propelled
African states and peoples from the indignity of colonial, racist and alien rule to full
and equal participation in the international legal system. For contributionists,
decolonialization celebrates Africa's arrival into modern international law, which
Africa has helped craft.
Furthermore, Elias pointed out that prior to European conquest Africa had
always been a participant in the international community. He rejected colonization as

24 Gathh (2020). See also footnote 40 on George Galindo's plea to avoid periodization.
25 Christopher Gevers, 'Literal 'Decolonisation': Re-reading African International Legal Scholarship through the

African Novel' in Jochen von Bernstorff & Phillip Dann (eds.), The Battle for InternationalLaw: South and North
Perspectives on the DecolonizationEra (OUP, 2019).
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signifying the move from a people without history towards global incorporation, or as
a transitory epoch from fragmented alienation towards collective international
solidarity. According to Elias:
[i]f we are to grasp something of the significance of Africa in current international
affairs, we must begin with a brief account of the role which different parts of the socalled dark continent played since recorded history in their internal as well as their
external relations.26

For Elias, colonialism interrupted the way African states such as Carthage interacted
with European states in the precolonial period. Having discussed precolonial AfricanEuropean trade and diplomatic links, Elias portrays colonialism as an abrupt
interruption to Euro-African contact. This interruption of African sovereignty had
consequences since:
only sovereign states were at any time the subject of customary international law. The
drama of international legal relations was being played out, so far as Africa is
concerned, by European governments among themselves with regard to economic,
technical and cultural matters. Customary law was developing in many respects as a
result of the continuous changes taking place in the continent, but the African
dependencies were mere spectators in the game. African dependencies' contribution,
if any, lay in the fact that they were suppliers of the raw material for evolving rules
and practices of international relations during the heyday of colonial rule.27

Africa's sovereignty in abeyance during colonial rule was restored upon independence,
while membership in United Nations guaranteed their equality with other states.
Hence, Elias was optimistic and confident about the 'equal participation' of African
states, writing:
[i]ndependence has led to membership of the United Nations and its organs and the
consequent widening of the international horizon of all member nations, resulting in
the establishment of new institutions and processes and in the enlargement of
participation in the making and development of contemporary international law. No
longer is the law of the world court to be confined within the sometimes narrow imits setfor it by the
olderfew; modern internationallaw must be based on a wider consensus, in the sense that it must be
a reflection of the prncipallegal systems and cultures of the world ... The contribution which
the third world in general, and Africa in particular, is making to contemporary
international law will in time increase both in quantity and quality especially within
the framework of the United Nations. 28

Elias emphasized that the equal participation and contribution of newly independent
states to the international community was the most significant achievement of
26 T.O. Elias, Africa and the Development of InternationalLaw (Sijthoff Leiden, 1972) 3.
27

Ibid, 21.

28 Ibid, 33 (emphasis added).
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formerly colonized countries. As Elias argued in his 1989 text, The United Nations
Charter and the

World Court, 'universality rather than limited application . . must now

be the catchword in the expanding frontiers of international law under the United
Nations Charter.'

9

Elias emphasized the 'equal dignity and worth' of all United

Nations members and the need not only to abolish inequalities among them but for
both new and old states to cooperate with goodwill to achieve United Nations goals.30
In Elias, we see a commitment to sovereignty and human dignity informed by the
United Nations Charter, a commitment that he called modern international law.
Unlike African critical theorists of his time, Elias' contributionist project did
not explore how ostensible sovereign equality in the United Nations era could disguise
unequal North-South relationships. Similarly, Nasila S. Rembe placed hope in the
sovereign equality of states notwithstanding their differences in economic, military and
other capabilities. 31 Elias went further though, seeking to displace the Eurocentric
notion that Africa was a primitive backwater. He sought to displace the view embodied
in international law that Africans were neither Christian nor civilized and as such were
not entitled to enjoy sovereignty over their land or their people. He showed similarities
between African and European societies including the concept of sovereignty. The
argumentative strategy employed by Elias and other contributionist scholars was aimed
at establishing accommodation for African cultural heritage as a part of international
civilization that contributes to international law.
In establishing these similarities, contributionist scholars failed to examine
some of the ways in which international law justified exploitation through claims of
European superiority based on racial, cultural and indigenous difference in the colonial
era. Elias fell short of unearthing the various ways in which the colonial apparatuses
of international law were carried forward in the United Nations era.32 Makau Mutua
argues that such an approach 'sought inclusion [of African states] without being critical

29 T.O. Elias, The United Nations Charterand the

World Court (Nigerian Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, 1989)

2.

30 Ibid, 8.

31 Nasila S. Rembe, Africa and the InternationalLaw of the Sea: A Study in the Contribution of Afr/can States to the Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (Springer, 1980) 7. Rembe opines 'that although state sovereignty
presupposes legal equality, states may be greatly unequal in size, population, economic and military capabilities . .
[yet] despite the influence of other factors in inter-state relations, the concept of sovereign equality of states remains
an important aspect in the conduct of state relations.' Rembe places hope in the fact that, though African states
lack real power, 'their numerical strength has increased their voting power'. Similarly, the economic inequality
between newly independent and old states was not lost on mainstream scholars of international law who were in
many respects much like Elias. For example, Louis Henkin, Richard Crawford Pugh, Oscar Schachter and Hans

Smit, InternationalLaw Casesand MaterialsThird Edition (West Group, 1993), argue that the 'growing gap between the
economically developed and the economically less developed countries' was a major development of the postSecond World War period that 'signaled a new departure in the evolution of international law.'
32 For an excellent exploration of the legacies of colonialism, see Antony Anghie, Inperiaism, Sovereignty and the

Making of InternationalLaw (CUP, 2005).
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of the normative edifice of international law.'

33

Contributionists may in this sense

validate a kind of Africanity that does not seriously engage with the colonial origins of
international law. However, this is precisely what Elias was trying to displace. His
revisionist legal historiography aimed to disallow any reading of international law as
exclusively European

or colonial. He defended the unity and coherence

of

international law as a truly universal discipline. Elias was a very different scholar from
someone such as Mohammed Bedjaoui who saw modern international law as the
continuation of, rather than the overcoming of, a colonial tradition. Elias looks back
and tells us that if you want to understand nineteenth century international law, do not
just look to what European states were doing, or take the writings of European jurists
such as Wheaton or Lorrimer to be definitive. Look to Africa as well.34

The CriticalApproach
Unlike contributionists, critical theorists such as Mohammed Bedjaoui and U.O.
Umozurike centered their analysis on the structural and economic underpinnings of
African states in the world. 35 While contributionists identified the exclusion of Africa
from international law, African critical scholars in the post-Second World War era
focused on power and wealth imbalances between African countries and the rest of
the world, seeing such imbalances as reasons to be skeptical of international law.
Critical

scholars

contemporary

examined

international

the

continuity of colonialism

law, critiquing

the

and imperialism in

postcolonial

state

as

well as

international political economy.
For the critical tradition, self-determination through political independence
brought about a new period of subjugation through a postcolonial statehood modeled
along

European

lines.

36

Unlike

contributionists,

critical

theorists

saw

self-

determination not as a moment to return Africa to a past of reciprocal equal exchanges
with Europe and the rest of the world, but rather as a moment of betrayal. In the
critical tradition, analysis of early African contact with Europe placed emphasis on
issues such as the slave trade and colonial rule, while the contributionist tradition
emphasized commerce and diplomatic relations. For the critical tradition, customary
international law was regarded not as originating in the course of commercial and
33 Makau Mutua, 'Typologies of Scholarship on Africa' (2013) 107 Proceedingsof the Annual Meeting of the American
Soiety of InternationalLaw 189.
34

The foregoing paragraphs are based on Gathii (2012).

35

U.O. Umozurike, InternationalLaw and Coloniaismin Africa (Nwamife, 1979).

36 Obiora Chinedu Okafor, Re-defining Legitimate Statehood: InternationalLaw and State Fragmentationin Africa. (Martin
Nijhoff, 2000); Makau Mutua, 'Why Redraw the Map of Africa: A Moral and Legal Inquiry' (1995) 16 Michbgan
Journalof InternationalLaw 1113.
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diplomatic links between Africa and Europe, but rather arising as a consequence of
industrial capitalism in the west and the territorial and commercial ambitions of
western powers. 37 For the critical tradition, international law was regarded as a
handmaiden of the expanding economic interests of colonizing countries.
Thus, critical theorists focus on the manner in which modern international law
continues the legacy of colonial disempowerment, while at times providing some space
for resistance and reform. For African critical theorists, a central question is how to
'defang international law of its imperialist and exploitative biases against the global
south' in general and Africa in particular. 38 For some, such as Justice Joel Ngugi of the
High Court of Kenya, international law cannot be reformed from within its own
assumptions.39 For such scholars, the fact that international law is based upon western
epistemological assumptions as the yardstick against which non-western peoples and
legal forms are to be evaluated, requires debunking those starting assumptions to the
extent that they are based on the presumed superiority of the west.40 For such scholars,
the legitimization of the third world state by postcolonial elites was not the end of
decolonization but the problematic reproduction and universalization of the western
'

state. 4

The subsequent section continues to consider the critical tradition in African
international law, making the case that one can trace the radical origins of the right to
development to African jurists such as Doudou Thiam in the post-Second World War
period. Following from this, the contributions of Keba Mbaye are examined as
evidencing a third strain of African international law scholarship that is neither wholly
contributionist nor wholly critical. By examining the case made by African jurists for
37 B.S. Chimni, 'Customary International Law: A Third World Perspective' (2018) 112:1 American Journal of
InternationalLaw 1.
38 Makau Mutua, 'Review' (2010) 104:3 The American Journalof InternationalLaw 532.
39

Joel Ngugi, 'Making New Wine in Old Wineskins: Can the Reform of International Law Emancipate the Third

World in the Age of Globalization' (2002) 8 UC Davis Journalof InternationalLaw and Po/4y 73.
40 In this respect, TWAIL scholars share much in common with decolonial scholars such as Walter Mignolo, 'The

Enduring Enchantment (or the epistemic privilege of modernity and where to go from here)' (2002) 101:4 South
AtlanticQuarterly927, at 936. For a similar view, see Diane Otto, 'Subalternity and International Law: The Problems

of Global Community and the Incommensurability of Difference' (1996) 5:3 Social & Legal Studies 337. Notably,
there is debate about whether to split TWAIL into different traditions dominant in certain periods, as I have in this
essay by arguing there is a contributionist and critical approach in African international law scholarship. For

example, George Galindo, 'Splitting TWAIL?' (2016) 33

Windsor Yearbook

of Access to Justice 40, argues that such

periodization 'invariably affects any theory, methodology or historical narrative supported by TWAIL scholars
since the fixing of periods produces bias and reductions and can obliterate possibilities for the emergence of
different perspectives'. Ignacio De La Rasilla, 'The Problem of Periodization in the History of International Law'

(2019) 37:1 Law and Histo , Review 275, explains that periodization is 'a task that involves making decisions of
exclusion and inclusion regarding scale, time, space, and the planning of the use of archival, bibliographical, and
other relevant historical sources'. See also James Gathii, 'The Promise of International Law: A Third World View',
Grotius Lecture, American Society of International Law Virtual Meeting (2020) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/

papers.cfm?abstractid=3635509.
41 Mutua (1995).
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a right to development in the late 1960s, it becomes clear that the critical tradition of
international law in Africa predates the rise of dependency theories of the early 1960s,
and that Africa played a central part in anticolonial resistance within international law
in the middle of the twentieth century.42

3

The Radical Vision of the Right to Development

Contextualizjng the Radical Vision of the Right to Development
In the late 1960s, then Senegalese Foreign Minister, Doudou Thiam, in a 1967 speech
to the Group of 77 argued that 'Africa demands a new international law' to replace
colonial international law (pacte du conquete). That new international law would have a
right to development for the third world: 'nous devonsproclamer... pourles nations du TiersMonde le droit au developpement. " Under this vision, the right to development belonged
to the third world, the former colonies. He conceptualized it as a collective right to
correct the wrongs wrought by colonial rule. The role of international law then,
through this demand of a right to development, included a rejection of the old
international law that Mohammed Bedjaoui argued undergirded colonial subjugation."
According to Bedjaoui, '[t]he new legal order must make provision within itself for the
development of all nations in the world and must provide for international economic
cooperation

raised to the dignity of a legal institution acknowledged to be

fundamental.'

45

From the outset, this radical vision of the right to development, which

was a clarion call of the New International Economic Order (NIEO) and the Charter
of the Rzghts and Duties of States, was ridiculed by first world states and scholars.

6

First

world states argued that these radical demands constituted an unjustifiable effort to

42 Gevers (2018). This view differs from that which traces critical international legal scholarship from Africa to the
dependency movement and the rise of a radical political economy critique based at the University of Dar-es-Salaam.

43 Doudou Thiam, 'L'Afrique demande un droit international d'un nouveau' (1968) 1:1 TVerfassung und Recht in Ubersee
52; Philip Alston, 'The Right to Development at the International Level' in Rene-Jean Dupuy (ed.), The Right to
Development at the InternationalLevel (Kluwer, 1990). Notably, Alston notes that Ecuador in the 1940s had drafted a
version of the Declaration of Rzghts and Duties of States that included a reference to states having a right to peaceful
and secure development.
44 Bedjaoui (1979).
4s Ibid, 114.
46 Antony Anghie, 'Legal Aspects of the New International Economic Order' (2015) 6:1 Humanity 145, at 145-146,
argues that the NIEO was viewed with some hostility by developed countries. The responses were varied. Irving
Kristol accused the Third World of 'maumauing' the West, which was its actual or potential benefactor. Henry
Kissinger began a concerted campaign to organize the rich against the poor. More moderately, Willy Brandt headed
a Commission that eventually published the report that would bear his name, which attempted to demonstrate how
all countries, rich and poor alike, could benefit from international reform. See Danie J. Sargent, 'North/South: The
United States Responds to the New International Economic Order' (2015) 6:1 Humanity 201.
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extend the concept of sovereignty to economic relations. 47 By their account, economic
relations were best left to market forces free from government intervention. First
world scholars argued that academic voices like those of Bedajoui who supported this
radical vision were shrill, inept and polemical. 48
For those who advocated for the right to development from a radical
perspective, colonialism and its legacies are a central feature to the making not only of
postcolonial Africa, but of the modern international order.4 9 Indeed, the political
leaders who supported a right to development from the mid-twentieth century,
particularly in the debates surrounding the New International Economic Order and
the Charter for the Economic Rights and Duties of States, focused on colonial-capitalist
modernity and its violent processes of domination and exploitation. For Mohammed
Bedjaoui, this meant that:
the right to development is nothing other than the right to an equitable share in the
economic and social well-being of the world. It reflects an essential demand of our
time since four-fifths of the world population no longer accept that the remaining
fifth should continue to build its wealth on their poverty. 50

Bedjaoui went on to argue that the right to development flows from the right of selfdetermination - in fact, that the right to development was inherent, built into, and
forming an inseparable part of the right to self-determination.51 Bedjaoui had
advocated for Algerian self-determination in earlier writings and the right to
development according to Bedjaoui was 'much more of a right of the State or of the
people, than a right of the individual. 52 Bedjaoui's account of international law was
that it had 'made use of a series of justifications and excuses to create legitimacy for
the

subjugation and pillaging of the Third World, which was pronounced

47 Norbert Horn, 'Normative Considerations of a New International Economic Order' (1982) 16 Journalof World
Trade Law 338, at 343. For an alternative view, see B.S. Chimni, 'The Principle of Permanent Sovereignty Over

Natural Resources: Toward a Radical Interpretation' (1998) 38 Indian Journalof InternationalLaw 208, at 208, 214,
arguing

m

favor of examining material as opposed to statist interpretations of international law.

Marc Williams, 'Book Review (of The Objectives of the New InternationalEconomic Order by Ervin Laszlo; A New
InternationalEconomic Order: Towarda FairRedistributionof the World's Resources byJyoti Shankar Singh; Issues andProspects
for the New InternationalEconomic Orderby William G. Tyler; Towards a New InternationalEconomic Orderby Mohammed
Bedjaoui)' (1980) 2:4 Third Wor/d Quartery 782.
48

49 For the analogous claim made in the international relations field, see Branwen Gruffydd Jones, 'African AntiColonialism in International Relations: Against the Time of Forgetting' m M. IMiguez de Heredia, Z. Wai (eds.),

RecenteringAfrica in InternationalRelations (Palgrave, 2018).
so Mohammed Bedjaoui, 'The Right to Development' in Bedjaoui (1991).
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid. Bedjaoui elaborates further noting that 'the most important and comprehensive [aspect of the right to

development] is the right of each people freely to choose its economic and social system without outside
interference or constraint of any kind, and to determine, with equal freedom, its own model of development.'
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uncivilized'. 53 Suffice to say, critics of this approach, such as Jack Donnelley, argued
that conceptualizing development as a right was a fallacy since there was no right to
be developed. 54
Notwithstanding these criticisms of a radical right to development until well
into the 1970s, the then-Organization of African Unity (OAU) did not shy away from
mentioning colonialism in its blueprints for development.

For example, in the

preamble of the 1973 Addis Ababa Declaration, also referred to as the African Declaration
on Cooperation, Development and International Independence, the OAU noted:
Believing that neither language differences nor differences of economic size or
structure constitute insurmountable obstacles to economic co-operation and regional
integration, and that all barriers to intra-African co-operation, especially those which are

remnants of colonialism or by-products of the vertical relations of dominance exercised over Africa
by the developed countries, can be eradicated. 55
This Declaration also expressed hope for the 'establishment of a more equitable
international order in the economic, commercial and monetary fields'. 56 This radical
approach was also embodied in the Lagos Plan of Action for the Implementation of the 1980
Monrovia Strategyfor the Economic Development of Africa that emphasized self-reliance and
self-sustaining development.57 This vision rejected neoclassical development that
dictated to African governments through international financial institutions how they
had to reform their economies. Doudou Thiam argued that the agenda of developing
countries was to 'lay the foundations for a new world society' and this required
bringing about a revolution whose agenda he argued would require these countries to:
tear down all the practices, institutions and rules on which international economic
relations are based, in so far as these practices, institutions and rules sanction injustice
and exploitation and maintain the unjustified domination of a minority over the
majority of men . . The right of peoples to self-determination, the sovereign equality
of peoples, international solidarity - all these will remain empty words, and, forgive
me for saying so, hypocritical words, until relations between nations are viewed in the

53 Ibid, 49. Bedjaoui further argued that classic international law 'recognized and enforced a "right of domination"

for the benefit of the "civilized nations". This was a colonial and imperial right, institutionalized at the Berlin
Conference on the Congo'.
s4 Jack Donnelly, 'In Search of the Unicorn: The Jurisprudence and Politics of the Right to Development' (1985)

15 California Wester Intemationa! Law Journal 473.
55 Aftican Declaration on Cooperation, Development and International Independence (28 May 1973) https://archives.au.int/

bitstream/handle/123456789/5947/African%20Declaration%20on%20Cooperation%20Development%20and%
20Economic%20Independence _E.pdfsequence=1&isAllowed=y
56

(accessed 14 August 2020).

Ibid.

57 For an overview, see Claude Ake, Democracy and Development in Afica (Brookings,1996).
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light of economic and social facts. From this point of view, the facts contradict the
principles.58

Thiam argued this new world vision was embodied in the United Nations Charter. He
regarded the 1955 Bandung Conference as providing developing countries an
opportunity to:
formulate a new world economic charter. We shall attend, not in order to present a
list of complaints, but to demand and claim what is ours, or, more precisely, what is
due to man, whatever his nationality, his race or his religion ... [T]his means that the
Bandung we are proposing will not be a Bandung of hatred; it will be a Bandung of
justice, balance and reason; it will be a Bandung held under the aegis of man. 59

As Mahmood Mamdani has acknowledged, the first generation of Africa's postcolonial
intellectuals primarily examined Africa's political economy to the exclusion of other
variables to account for the predicaments of the postcolonial state.60 Today's critical
scholars that embrace Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) are as
critical of the missteps of postcolonial states that have exacerbated their own
challenges in the postcolonial period as they are of the legacy of colonialism in
'

contemporary international law.6

On the best strategy for pursuing an African agenda in the postcolonial era,
African countries were as divided as African scholars and practitioners of international
law. Within the OAU, there was the radical Casablanca Group that wanted immediate
political unity and a supranational continental body. On the other hand, there were the
moderate Monrovia and Brazzaville Groups that advocated for a loose confederation
This divergence on one of the central African problems in the 1960s

-

of states engaged in intergovernmental cooperation on a gradual timetable.62
continental unity - continues today in many settings on contemporary international
legal issues. Kwame Nkrumah, Modibo Keita, S6kou Tour6, and Cheikh Anta Diop
argued in favor of African continental solidarity and unity in the OAU in the 1960s.
For them, continental solidarity and unity were fundamental prerequisites for Africa's
58

As quoted in Daniel J. Whelan, "'Under the Aegis of Man": The Right to Development and the Origins of the

New International Economic Order' (2015) 6:1 Humanity 93. See also Index to Proceedingsof the UnitedNations General
Assembly: Twenty-FirstSession 1966, Ffth Spedal Session 1967, 94 https://library.un.org/sites/library.un.org/files/itp/
a21-specialsess-5_0_1.pdf (accessed 13 August 2020).
59 As quoted in Daniel J. Whelan, "'Under the Aegis of Man": The Right to Development and the Origins of the

New International Economic Order' (2015) 6:1 Humanity 93, 94.
60 M. Mamdani, 'Beyond Settler and Native as Political Identities: Overcoming the Political Legacy of Colonialism'

in P.I. Ozo-Eson and U. Ukiwo (eds.), Ideology and African Development, Proceedings of the Third Memorial Programmein
honour of Prof ClaudeAke (African Centre for Democratic Governance, 2001) 1-2.
These scholars include among others Antony Anghie, B.S Chimni, Michael Fakhri, Karin Mickelson, Makau
Mutua, Usha Natarajan, Vasuki Nesiah, Obiora Okafor, Balakrishnan Rajagopal and Celestine Nyamu.
61

62 Zdenek Cervenka, The

OrganisationofAfrican Uni&

and its Charter(Praeger, 1969) 15.
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economic transformation, particularly in its economic relations at the global level.63
The underlying assumption was that if development policies were collectively
formulated and implemented by African states, then it was easier to achieve the
continent's

socioeconomic

objectives.

For Nkrumah

in

particular,

defeating

neocolonialism required continental solidarity, since the former colonial powers and
their multinational corporations were continuing to exploit Africa in the postcolonial
era.64 Continental unity was seen as a natural extension of the newly acquired right to
self-determination.
We see the continuation of this radical view among a small group of African
states that argue that the African ContinentalFree Trade Agreement is exactly the kind of
economic bloc that Nkrumah thought was necessary to counteract Africa's marginality
in the global economy.65 That small group of African states is also currently advocating
for a united approach to negotiating with the European Union for the possible renewal
of the Cotonou PartnershipAgreement, which is set to expire in December 2020." By
contrast, the vast majority of African states have taken the Brazzaville perspective of
each country negotiating on its own with the European Union. The Brazzaville or
moderate perspective in the immediate post-independence era was articulated by
leaders such as F6lix Houphou&t-Boigny, Jomo Kenyatta, and L6opold Senghor, who
supported gradual rather than immediate continental integration and advocated for
cooperation rather than confrontation with former colonial powers.
Doudou Thiam wrote in 1963 that the nature of the relationship between
Africa and the rest of the world would be determined by whether Africans can unite
in what he called macro-nationalism, or remain fragmented in micro-nationalism.

63 According to Nkrumah, 'Divided we are weak; united, Africa could become one of the greatest forces for good
in the world. I believe strongly and sincerely that with the deep-rooted wisdom and dignity, the innate respect for
human lives, the intense humanity that is our heritage, the African race united under one federation, will emerge
not as just another world bloc to flaunt its wealth and strength, but as a great power whose greatness is indestructible
because it is built not on fear, envy and suspicion, nor won at the expense of others, but founded on hope, trust,

friendship and directed to the good of all mankind.' Kwame Nkrumah, I Speak of Freedom: A Statement of African
Ideology (Heinemann, 1961).
64 Kwame Nkrumah, Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism (Thomas Nelson, 1966); Kwame Nkrumah, Africa
Must Unite (Praeger, 1970) and Nkrumah (1961).
65

African Union Commission Chairperson, Moussa Faki, reflected the views of this group of African states when
he said at the signing of the Agreement in March 2018, '[f]or Africa, after decades of independence, marked by
persistent under-development and a marginal place in the international system, the terms of the debate are laid
down m almost Manichean terms: Unite or Perish, as Kwame Nkrumah said at the Addis Ababa founding Summit'.
See African Union, 'AU Member Countries Create History by Massively Signing the AfCFTA Agreement in Kigali'
(21 March
2018) https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20180321/au-member-countries-create-history-massivelysigning-afcfta-agreement-kigah (accessed 29 September 2020).

66 The Cotonou PartnersbipAgreement, originally set to expire 29 February 2020, is extended to December 2020 while
the ACP and EU consider further negotiations. See European Commission, 'Press Release: New Africa-CaribbeanPacific/EU Partnership: Moving Forward towards a New Partnership Fit for the Future' (February 2020)
https://ec.europa.eu/international-partnerships/news/new-africa-caribbean-pacificeu-partnership-movingforward-towards-new-partnership-fit-futureen (accessed 13 August 2020).
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Thiam, who at the time was a member of the International Law Commission, believed
that African states were more interested in protecting their individual sovereign status
than in using collective unity to correct injustice.67 He also noted that the desire for
economic development among African states had made outside assistance a more
fundamental influence on foreign policy than socialism.68 Most significantly, Doudou
Thiam, much like many contemporary Third World Approaches to International Law
scholars (TWAILers), could see in 1962 that sovereignty would not resolve the
economic imbalance between developed and developing worlds. He noted that, in its
20 years, the United Nations had not made a dent on this inequality and that it had
failed to meet the goals of its first 'Development Decade'.

69

Although Thiam

acknowledged development was in the first place the responsibility of newlyindependent countries, he argued that 'meeting those responsibilities must be tied to
the fulfillment of duties held by developed countries'. 70 The 1967 Charter ofAliers of
the Group of 77, an important forerunner of the New International Economic Order,
summarized the Third World agenda. These were:
declining terms of trade; a drop in the share of exports of the developing world in the
global economy, and thus of their purchasing power; growing indebtedness of the
Third World; the inability of most countries to take advantage of improvements in
technology ... virtual stagnation in food production, which, coupled with population
increases ...
aggravated the chronic conditions of under-nourishment and
malnutrition. 7 1

Not much has changed for many formerly colonial countries, especially those in
Africa. 72 For Thiam, as for many current day TWAILers, the postcolonial period was
a continuation of colonial economic disparities. 73 For Thiam, the United Nations Charter
and the Charterof Economic Rights and Duties of States were a 'call for justice in the basic
rules of international economic relations'. 74

Doudou Thiam, The ForeignPo/4y ofAfrican States: IdeologicalBases, Present Realities, Future Prospects(Phoenix House,
1965); Charles Rooks, 'Review: The Foreign Policy of African States by Doudou Thiam' (1967) 61:2 American

67

PoiticalScience Review 553.
68
69

Thiam (1965).
Whelan (2015). This conclusion was reached by Mahbub ul Haq, a Pakistani development economist. See Samuel

Moyn, Not Enough: Human RPghts in an Unequal World (Belknap, 2018); UnitedNations Index to Proceedingsof the General
Assembly: Twenty-FirstSession 1966, Ffth Special Session 1967, 93 https://library.un.org/sites/library.un.org/files/itp/
a21-specialsess-5_0_1.pdf (accessed 12 August 2020).
70

Moyn (2018).

71 1967 Charter of Algiers https://www.g77.org/doc/algier-1.htm.
72 Moyn (2018).
73 Thiam (1968).
74 Ibid.
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The politics of international economic transformation represented in the
radical and moderate positions are also evident when it comes to international human
rights. Only a small group of African countries have signed a declaration under Article
34(6) of the African Court Protocol allowing individuals to bring cases against them in
the African Court of Human and Peoples' Rights. 75 The vast majority of African
countries are reluctant to allow international courts jurisdiction over issues they
consider to be within their exclusive jurisdiction. Africa's engagement with its external
partners, as well as within Africa, cannot be defined in singular or unified terms.76
The multiple layers and understandings of the right to development today
should not be allowed to obscure its more radical visions. The right to development
has now been appropriated in a variety of ways that embrace the status quo. Peter
Uvin convincingly

shows

the appropriation of the right to development by

international financial institutions, donor countries and agencies when he argues:
There is real danger ... in this kind of rhetorical discourse. Far from constituting the
first step towards a fundamental reconceptualisation of the practice of development
cooperation, it seems merely to provide a fig leaf for the continuation of the status
quo. By postulating that development projects and programmes by definition
constitute an implementation of human rights, the important difference between a
service-based and a rights-based approach to development is obscured. To have a
right to something - say, food - it not just about having enough of that: a slave can
be well nourished too. 77

The reconceptualizing of development as a right became appropriated by donor
agencies in cooperation with formerly colonial countries, abandoning the more radical
vision of the right to development in at least three ways. First, this approach shifts
focus away from external and north-south issues and the constitutive role of colonial
rule and its legacies,

78

focusing instead on domestic and internal development issues.

Second, this shift represents development relationships between the global north and
south as cooperative instead of confrontational.79 Issa Shivji, who is similarly critical
of the shift away from the radical vision of the right to development, argues that this
view presupposes that development is 'a gift/charity from above rather than the result

75

Art. 34(6) African Court Protocol.

76James Gathii, African Regional Trade Agreements as Legal Regimes (CUP, 2011) 73.
77

Peter Uvin, 'From the Right to Development to the Rights-Based Approach: How "Human Rights" Entered

Development' (2007) 17 Development in Practice 597, at 600.

78 James Gathii, Empowering the Weak, Protecting the Powerful: A Critique of Good Governance Proposals, Unpublished SJD
Thesis, Harvard Law School (1999).
79 Arjun Sengupta, 'On the Theory and Practice of the Right to Development' (2002) 24:4 Human RightsQuarterly
837; Konrad Ginther, 'Participation and Accountability: Two Aspects of the Internal and International Dimension

of the Right to Development' (1992) Third World Legal Studies 55.
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of struggles from below'. 80 Third, this chastened view enables international financial
institutions, western donors and investors to identify non-western peoples and states
as development failures in need of assistance, which lays the basis for their intervention
as experts with specialized knowledge and resources. 81 In other words, the shift away
from the more radical vision of the right to development abandons the antiimperialist
politics of diplomats such as Thiam. Shivji says it best: the more radical vision
associated with the right to development should be thought of as a 'category of
intellectual thought and a guiding post for political struggle' that is at once panAfricanist and anti-imperialist. 2
Makau Mutua is even less hopeful about human rights discourse in Africa
when he concludes that it comprises of a triad of primitive savages, innocent helpless
victims, and saviors from Europe and North America that is reminiscent of the
colonial era. 83 The savages, victims and saviors metaphor falls within the historical
continuum of the Eurocentric colonial project, casting actors into superior and
subordinate positions, and undermining the human rights movement's basic claim of
universality and equality. 84 For Mutua, a historical understanding of the struggle for
human dignity should locate the impetus of a universal conception of human rights in
those societies subjected to European tyranny and imperialism. 85 Mutua argues that
some of the most important work done for the human rights movement, including the
pioneering work of many non-western activists, are not acknowledged by the
contemporary human rights movement. Together with norms anchored in nonwestern cultures and societies, non-western scholarship has either been overlooked or
rejected in the current understanding of human rights. 86

80 Issa Shivji, The Concept of Human Rights in Africa (Codesria, 1989) 82.
81 Arturo Escobar, EncounteringDevelopment: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World (Princeton, 1995); Anghie
(2005).
82 Issa Shivji, 'Pan-Africanism or Imperialism?' 2nd Bill Dudley Memorial Lecture, Nigerian Political Science
Association, Nsuka, Nigeria (July 2005); Issa Shivji, Pan-Afcanism or Pragmatism?Lessonsfrom Tanganyika-Zangibar
Union (Mkuki na Nyota, 2008).
83 Makau Mutua,

Human Rzghts: A Po/iticaland CulturalCitique (University of Pennsylvania, 2002).

84 Makau Mutua, 'Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights' (2001) 42:1 HarvardInternational
Law Journal201, at 201, 207.
85 Ibid, 205.
Ibid. Mutua argues that the most important events preceding the post-1945 United Nations-led human rights
movements included the anticolonial struggles in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, and the struggles for women's
suffrage and equal rights throughout the world.
86
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Keba Mbaye and the Right to Development: A ThirdApproach to InternationalLaw in Africa?
Keba Mbaye's approach to the right to development, though he did not adopt the
critical stance of scholars such as Mutua and Shivji, nevertheless rejected several
conceptions of universal human rights. First, Mbaye rejected a solely individualist
conception of rights, instead embracing the importance of both individual and
collective rights. 87 He argued that it was necessary to create 'a socio-political system
wherein individual rights are temporarily limited for the benefit of the general
interest.'88 Though he embraced this collective view to a certain extent, he also argued
that the indicators to be used to determine the level of development in a society or
group ought to refer to the plight of individuals. 89 Mbaye's approach to the right to
development

unites

aspects

of the

critical and contributionist traditions

of

international law because it does not pursue a public-private distinction. Unlike
contributionists who largely shut out economic issues and their colonial histories,
Mbaye does not. He grounds the right to development in political economy as well as
morality. Let us begin with his reference to colonialism. He argues:
The colonial adventure of Europeans has led them into contact with foreign peoples
to establish with them relations of domination in which the justification has been
sought in racial, moral and religious differences; that economic interest has been
maintained up to this date. 90

Mbaye traces how colonies were used as sources for cheap raw materials and labor by
colonial powers and how development assistance facilitated the ability of former
'

colonies to be a market for the products of developed economies. 9

The continuation of colonial economic patterns into the postcolonial era is a
major theme of the critical tradition.92 Mbaye was cognizant of the growing economic
gap between underdeveloped and developed countries and the sheer inability of
development assistance to close this gap.93 He raised the issue of growing third world
debt and the fact that agricultural productivity was not keeping up with population
87 Keba Mbaye, 'Le droit au developpement comme un droit de l'homme' (1972) 5 Droits de l'homme 503, at 505.

88 Ibid, 506-508.
89

Ibid.

90

Ibid, 518.

91

Ibid, 515.

92 Michael

Fakhri, Sugar and the Making of InternationalLaw (CUP, 2014); Sundhya Pahuj a, Decolonising International
Law: Development, Economic Growth and the Politics of Universa/4'y
2
; James Gathii, 'Neo-Liberalism,
Colonialism and International Governance: Decentering the International Law of Governmental Legitimacy'

(2000) 98:6 Michbgan Law Review 1996.
93 Mbaye (1972) 533. He notes that 'technical progress will make the planet small, putting at the doors of the rich
the groveling multitude of the Third World, more angrythan ever, more than ever revolted by an injustice resented

more and more as a provocation.'
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growth. 94 Further, he exposes how foreign assistance is used by developed economies
to reward their third world clients, hitting yet another theme of the critical tradition of
international law.95 He argues that the riches of the developed world and the poverty
of the former colonies requires rethinking this inequitable international system."
Further, in the critical tradition, Mbaye

argues we should pay attention

to

underdevelopment and that some of the failures of the postcolonial state could be
thought of as the effects rather than the cause of underdevelopment.97
However, the most significant justification for the right to development
according to Mbaye is solidarity with the freedom of others 98 - the freedom of
individuals to be free of famine, sickness and ignorance." He argued that the circle of
the human family was growing 'from person to the family then to the people, to the
Today, the dimension is towards the universal'.1'

The

challenge of this march according to Mbaye were 'egoisms' at 'the level of regions'.'

'

small town, to the country . .

Mbaye argued that the right to development was already inscribed in international law
in the UniversalDeclarationof Human Rights as well as in the UnitedNations Charter.'0 2 For
him, the right to development was not only legal but 'necessarily linked with the right
to life, to live well and always better, therefore to develop oneself.'0 3
I categorize Mbaye in an intermediate category between contributionists and
critical theorists because of how he appealed to notions of a common or shared
humanity as well as what he referred to as common values to justify the right to
development. He argued that 'international conscience' as well as 'well-being and
justice', as part of his broader vision of universal solidarity, justified the right to
development.10 4 Unlike contributionists, he rejected legal formalism and argued that
legal formalism was a narrow philosophical positivism.1 05 Thus, he resorted to natural

94 Ibid, 533.

9s Mbaye

(1972) 518.

96 Ibid, 522. He asks rhetorically, 'is there not another way to embark upon the coexistence of nations? Is it not
time to have recourse to something else?'

97 Ibid, 523.
98

Ibid.

99 Ibid, 524.
100 Ibid, 524-525.
101

Ibid, 526.

102

Ibid.

103

Ibid, 528.

104

Ibid, 525.

105

Ibid, 526.
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law, which in his view embraced universal ethical values and universal civilization as a
foundation for the recognition of a right to development.
What sets Mbaye apart from both contributionists and critical theorists is how
he resorts to western philosophers such as Heidegger, Nietzsche, Descartes and Kant.
Perhaps aware that he was addressing a European audience, he felt the need to connect
the universal values he believed in with the universalism embraced by these European
philosophers. Mbaye for example argues, '[n]one better than Kant to come to our aid
in the search for an ethic of development, because it must be a categorical
imperative'. 106 By invoking European philosophers,

Mbaye departs from the

contributionist tradition that looks inward to African histories, epistemologies and
experiences to define an African approach to international law. Mbaye also departs
from the critical tradition in so doing because, in the critical tradition, the work of
natural law jurists and European philosophers is closely associated with the colonial
experience. For these reasons, Mbaye in my view charts an intermediate path between
contributionists and critical scholars of international law in Africa.

4

Conclusion

The purpose of this article has been to emphasize that in addition to the two traditions
of international law in Africa today - contributionism and critical approaches - there
is a third approach in the work of Keba Mbaye. All three approaches embody different
views of the right to development. From the perspective of contributionism, Africa
bequeathed the right to development to international human rights. The radical
approach to the right to development falls within the critical tradition, which examines
the international order through a lens of marginalization and domination of the third
world and its peoples by international law. Critical scholars are critical of norms of
international law that are framed in liberatory goals - sovereign equality, selfdetermination, human rights, development and equality.1 07 Critical scholars in the
TWAIL movement reveal how such liberatory goals coexist alongside economic
hierarchy and subordination between nations and carry forward within them the legacy
of colonial conquest and European imperialism.1 08
The third approach reflected in the scholarship of Mbaye shares some
similarities with both contributionists and critical scholars. Mbaye has an optimism in
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Gathii (2020).

108 Anghie (2005) 11-12 noting that imperialism or neocolonialism 'is a broader and more accurate term with which
to describe the practices of powerful Western states in the period following the establishment of the United
Nations' and that '[t]his period witness[ed] the end of formal colonialism, but the continuation, consolidation and
elaboration of imperialism'; Gathii (2000).
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the ability of international law to make a difference for individuals.10 9 Like the
contributionist approach, Mbaye embraces universality as an important component.
Contributionism does so because it embraces the idea that African contributions to
international law complete the university of international law. Mbaye embraces
universality, including universal ideas from European philosophers, to ground his
justifications for the right to development in natural law. Importantly, while both
contributionists

and Mbaye

embrace

the

universality and inclusivity

of the

international legal order, neither endorses a purely European view of universality that
centers the European or North American experience as the point from which all
comparison occurs." 0
In the critical tradition, Mutua argues that the Banjul Charter is an African
cultural

fingerprint

because

it foregrounds

collective

rights

and

individual

responsibilities, and because it establishes a starting point that is grounded in African
realities that recognize the need to embrace universal human rights norms without
being assimilated - that is, without having to accept as the starting premise a western
notion of rights."' Other critical scholars who have engaged the terms of universality
along the same lines include Abdullahi an Naim," 2 who uses Islam to legitimize and
advance human rights goals, and Celestine Musembi-Nyamu,

109

"3

Sylvia Tamale,"'

According to Antony Anghie, 'Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth-Century
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participation in international legal forums would result in the creation of a truly universal, just, and equal
international system'. Elsewhere, I have argued that third world jurists were very likely to be both critical but also
enamored with the potential of international law to make a difference for the future of the third world: Gathii,
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Penelope Andrews," 5 and Justice Yvonne Mokgoro,1"6 who provide a framework for
thinking about the interaction between customary norms as they relate to women, on
the one hand, and formal legal norms such as those embodied in Bills of Rights, on
the other, to advance the cause of women's human rights. Proceeding from such
nuanced perspectives, that are neither narrowly universalist in a Eurocentric sense, nor
parochially ethnocentric because they take too seriously Africanity to the exclusion of
ideals such as individual equality, seems to be to be an important insight that diverse
African approaches to international law provide.
One of the main insights that emerges from these competing and alternative
visions of the third world in postcolonial Africa is to acknowledge the disparate and
often competing strands of Third Worldism in a moment of declining United States
unipolarity. This decline opens an entry point for assessing third world visions of
regional and global order from the past and their continued vitality and relevance
today.11 7 Jeffrey James Byrne observed in a truism about Algeria's then nascent
anticolonial movement what is also appropriate in encapsulating the aspirations of
Africa's international law scholarship: it is characterized by simultaneously 'hybrid,
oscillating perhaps sometimes even contradictory identities and goals'." 8
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Rights (Routledge, 2012).
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